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CASE NOTES
Florida Homestead Exemption-PROCEEDS FROM THE VOLUN-
TARY SALE OF A HOMESTEAD-A SHIELD OR A TRAP FOR THE
DEBTOR?-McGuire v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. (In re
McGuire), 37 Bankr. 365 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984)
I. INTRODUCTION
The debtor in McGuire filed a complaint seeking to invalidate
two judicial liens held by the creditor,1 arguing that the liens im-
paired his homestead exemption rights under the Florida Constitu-
tion.2 In 1971, the debtor purchased his residence in Island Es-
1. Debtor had filed for bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982). Chapter 11
deals with debtor rehabilitation. Either a debtor or his creditors may commence chapter 11
proceedings by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court. A plan may be filed at the same
time as the petition or any time thereafter. Generally, a plan is the culmination of debtor-
creditor negotiations; in most cases, the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan. See 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1100.01 (L. King ed. 1984) (discussing historical evolution of
chapter 11); see also 2 id. § 109.04 (explaining who is deemed a debtor under chapter 11). In
reference to judicial liens, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982) states:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a
lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs
an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b)
of this section, if such lien is-(1) a judicial lien ....
Under subsection (b) an individual debtor may exempt either property specified under the
Bankruptcy Code, unless the state law applicable to the debtor specifically forbids the elec-
tion, or any property exempt under federal law other than as listed in the Code or applica-
ble state or local law. Under FLA. STAT. § 222.20 (1983), Florida residents are not entitled to
the federal exemptions provided in § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. Florida has "opted
out" in accordance with the provision of subsection (b), and consequently Florida law con-
trols exemptions.
2. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a):
There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judg-
ment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of taxes
and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or
repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed
on the realty, the following property owned by the head of a family:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one hundred
sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon, which shall not be re-
duced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent inclusion in a munici-
pality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-half acre of contig-
uous land, upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence of the
owner or his family.
Florida electors approved in November 1984 an amendment to § 4 which will have the
effect of eliminating the troublesome "head of family" issues. Under the amendment, a per-
son may designate property as homestead property, prior or subsequent to levy, whether or
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tates, Clearwater, Florida. He lived there with his wife and minor
children until May 10, 1983.1 At that time, debtor sold the house,
with the net proceeds totaling $42,471.12. 4 Sometime between May
10, 1983, and his death on September 23, 1983, the debtor entered
into a contract and deposited $1,000 for the purchase of a lot in
East Lake Woodlands, a residential community.' It appears that
the rest of the money was deposited in a passbook savings account.
The bankruptcy court held that the proceeds from the voluntary
sale of the homestead property did not retain the character of ex-
empt property. The court found the record devoid of evidence
demonstrating that the debtor intended to build a residence on the
lot or that the purchase of the lot was connected to the sale of the
former homestead and the construction of a new residence.6 Like-
wise, the court found the record lacking in respect to proof that
the funds realized from the sale of the former homestead were not
commingled with other monies.'
The Florida homestead exemption "is more often than not a
chameleon, which changes color to accord with the background
against which he is viewed."" Therefore, a review of Florida law
pertaining to the exempt status of proceeds from the voluntary
sale of homestead property, as set forth in Orange Brevard Plumb-
ing & Heating Co. v. La Croix,9 is prerequisite to the evaluation of
not he is the head of a family.
3. McGuire v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. (In re McGuire), 37 Bankr. 365, 365
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984).
4. The total sale price was $170,000 from which the debtor netted $61,216.59. From the
net proceeds, $42,417.12 was paid to the debtor and $18,745.47 was held in escrow pending
the outcome of the suit. Id.
5. Id. at 366. Although the debtor's widow was never substituted formally as party plain-
tiff, she was recognized as the real party in interest.
Under FLA. STAT. § 222.19 (1981), head of family status inured to the benefit of the surviv-
ing spouse. This provision was explicitly repealed with the recent approval of the amend-
ment to FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 4. See FLA. STAT. § 222.19 n.1 (1983). The amendment makes
head of family status irrelevant to the exemption.
6. McGuire, 37 Bankr. at 367.
7. Id.
8. Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption (pts. 1-3,
4, 5), 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 12, 12, 219, 396 (1949). See generally Maines & Maines, Our Legal
Chameleon Revisited: Florida's Homestead Exemption, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 227 (1978) (ex-
amining each aspect of homestead tax and forced sale exemptions in order to analyze the
purposes of each statutory and constitutional provision, treatment by the court, problems
with the conditions for exemptions, and statutory procedures for claiming and protecting
homestead exemptions).
9. 137 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1962). See generally Note; The Exemption of Proceeds from a
Voluntary Sale of Homestead Property, 17 U. MIAMi L. REV. 99 (1962) (proposing that the
court acted upon a legislative question and left unanswered many questions including how
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the bankruptcy court's decision in McGuire. Accordingly, this note
will examine those cases and the manner in which courts construe
exemptions in light of public policy considerations. Finally, this
analysis will point out the incorrectness of the McGuire holding in
light of both precedent and policy.
II. Orange Brevard AND SUBSEQUENT CASES
In Orange Brevard, the creditor obtained a writ of garnishment
against the proceeds of a voluntary sale of the debtor's homestead
property.10 The circuit court dissolved the writ, holding that the
provision of the Florida Constitution exempting homestead prop-
erty from forced sale by creditors extends to the proceeds of the
sale of the homestead.1 The Second District Court of Appeal
transferred the appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. 2
In that case of first impression, the supreme court acknowledged
a definite split of authority among jurisdictions and reviewed the
various positions concerning the exempt status of proceeds from a
voluntary sale.13 Ultimately the court adopted what was the minor-
intent may be proved and what period of time will be deemed reasonable).
10. Orange Brevard, 137 So. 2d at 201.
11. Id. at 202.
12. Id. at 202-03. The circuit court had construed a provision of the constitution and
therefore exclusive jurisdiction of the appeal rested with the supreme court under old FLA.
App. R. 2.1(a)(5)(d). The high court stated the precise issue as "whether the exemption of
homestead property from forced sale which is accorded by Article X, Section 1 of the Flor-
ida Constitution. . . extends also to the proceeds of a voluntary sale of a homestead when it
is intended in good faith that such proceeds are to be reinstated in a new homestead."
Orange Brevard, 137 So. 2d at 203.
13. Orange Brevard, 137 So. 2d at 204; see 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homestead § 46 (1968 &
Supp. 1984); 40 C.J.S. Homesteads § 71 (1944); Annot., 1 A.L.R. 483 (1919) (supplemented
by Annot., 46 A.L.R. 814 (1927)).
In the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, the volun-
tary sale of homestead property is held, in some jurisdictions, to be a complete
extinguishment of the homestead right; consequently, the proceeds of such a sale,
until invested in other exempt property, may be subjected to the claims of
creditors. ...
A view sometimes taken is that the proceeds of the sale of a homestead consti-
tute exempt property for a reasonable time pending the investment of the same in
another homestead. The exemption is said to be applicable to the amount in-
tended to be reinvested so long as the funds are held specifically for purchase of a
new homestead and not for the general purposes of the debtor.
40 AM. JUR. 2D Homestead § 46, at 146 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
Statutes addressing the proceeds of a voluntary sale of a homestead generally:
(1) give absolute right of exemption; or
(2) give no right of exemption; or
(3) give unconditional protection for a designated period; or
(4) protect proceeds intended to be reinvested in new homestead
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ity view and held that the proceeds of a voluntary sale are exempt
if the vendor shows an abiding good faith intention to reinvest the
proceeds in another homestead. 14
In discussing the exemption provision, the court stated:
[It] was not placed in our Constitution for the purpose of tying
the owner thereof and his family to a particular home, once estab-
lished, for the remaining period of their natural lives. It is a pro-
tection which should remain inviolate so long as the head of the
family who is indebted acts in good faith and with reasonable dil-
igence in converting one homestead into another. In our modern
peripatetic society it often becomes necessary for a family to give
up its former homestead and move to a new home out of eco-
nomic necessity or for other compelling reasons. To hold other
than we have in the instant case would be to deny to a family
finding itself in such circumstances the full benefit of the home-
stead exemption provision of our Constitution and would be inim-
ical to our declared policy of a liberal construction thereof.1 5
The court set out four criteria to be used in determining whether
proceeds from a voluntary sale retain the character of homestead
and are thus beyond the reach of creditors: (1) the sold property
must meet the constitutional requirement of a homestead;"6 (2) the
seller must show an abiding good faith intention prior to and at
the time of the sale of the homestead to reinvest the proceeds in
another homestead within a reasonable time; 7 (3) the funds must
not be commingled with other monies;18 and (4) the proceeds must
be invested in another homestead in a reasonable time.' 9 Further,
(a) for a designated period; or
(b) for a reasonable period.
See 40 C.J.S. Homesteads § 71, at 510-11 (1944).
14. Orange Brevard, 137 So. 2d at 204. Only the amount of money that is intended to be
reinvested in another homestead is exempt.
15. Id. at 206.
16. Id. at 207; see supra note 2.
17. Id. at 206. Presale intent and intent at the time of the sale can be difficult to prove.
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 218 P. 816, 819 (Okla. 1923) ("[Tlhe intention to use and occupy a
given tract of land as a homestead, and what is necessary to constitute such an intention
. . . is difficult to define in specific terms, and is dependent upon the circumstances and
conditions surrounding each particular case.").
18. Orange Brevard, 137 So. 2d at 206.
19. Id. The court analogized the principle set forth by its decision to the doctrine of
equitable conversion, citing Trotter v. Van Pelt, 198 So. 215 (Fla. 1940). The Trotter court
stated: "Under [the doctrine of equitable conversion], land which is directed to be converted
into money is treated as money and money which is directed to be invested in land is
treated as land." Id. at 218. See generally Comment, Exempt Status of Proceeds from Con-
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the court held that the burden of proof on the vendor is "by a
preponderance of the evidence."20
Since 1962 other courts have had occasion to interpret the Or-
ange Brevard decision and apply the outlined criteria. The Fifth
District Court of Appeal found Orange Brevard controlling in Sun
First National Bank v. Geiger.2 In addressing the intent issue, the
district court stated: "Orange Brevard requires the homestead
seller to show by a preponderance of the evidence a good faith in-
tention, both prior to and at the time of the sale, to reinvest the
proceeds of the sale into another homestead within a reasonable
time. 1 2 Without stating how the vendor had proven the required
good faith intention, the appellate court stated that the trial court
had found implicitly that such intent existed and that the record
contained evidence sufficient to support that finding.23
Geiger turned on the form of the proceeds and the reasonable-
ness of the time within which the proceeds were reinvested.24 The
court held that noncash proceeds can be eligible for exemption as
long as "they serve the same function that cash proceeds do, i.e., a
temporary form of the homestead, to be reinvested, to be con-
versions of the Homestead, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 410 (1962) (author investigates the applica-
tion of the constitutional homestead exemption to insurance payments, judgments awarded
for injuries to the homesteads, and surplus proceeds from involuntary conversions).
20. Orange Brevard, 137 So. 2d at 206. In a strong dissent, Justice Drew criticized the
decision as being judicial legislation. On the issue of intent, he stated that "[flor more than
eighty years this Court has said that mere intention cannot give even real property the
status of homestead." Id. at 210 (Drew, J., dissenting). Justice Drew questioned the major-
ity's opinion in light of Drucker v. Rosenstein, 19 Fla. 191 (1882), in which the Florida
Supreme Court stated that " 'the property must, when claimed as exempt, be stamped with
the character of a home by some circumstance other than the intention to make it so. A
bare lot unoccupied cannot be a homestead.'" Orange Brevard, 137 So. 2d at 209 (Drew, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Drucker, 19 Fla. at 198 (emphasis in original)).
21. 402 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The judgment creditors obtained a writ of gar-
nishment against the debtors of the judgment debtors. The judgment debtors and the debt-
ors of the judgment debtors moved to dissolve the writ, arguing that mortgage payments
owed by debtors to judgment debtors were intended by judgment debtors to be used to buy
a new homestead and therefore were exempt from levy of execution by the Florida
Constitution.
22. Id. at 431.
23. Id. The court also addressed the issue of reasonableness relating to the time period
for conversion. Finding that "reasonable time" extended beyond the time of garnishment,
the district court affirmed the lower court. However, the appellate court warned that ten
years is far in excess of reasonable time; creditors were given the signal that should the
debtors sit on their note and mortgage, another suit would be fruitful. Id. at 432.
24. "The Orange Brevard case clearly stands for the proposition that homestead prop-
erty can change into proceeds and still be protected. The issue is whether those proceeds
must be cash proceeds in order to come under the protection of Orange Brevard." Id. at 431.
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verted back into real-property homestead .... ",5
In Blackmon v. Hill,26 the Third District Court of Appeal ex-
amined whether the lower court's finding that sellers had not used
diligence to transfer good title was supported by sufficient evi-
dence.27 The lower court in its final judgment had ordered defen-
dants to make the title good, marketable, and insurable, "includ-
ing, but not limited to, obtaining a Declaratory Judgment under
the case of Orange Brevard .... ",2' The district court found the
lower court had misread Orange Brevard, stating: "That case . . .
holds only that proceeds from the sale of homestead property are
exempt from levy by judgment creditors provided the seller in-
tends to use the proceeds to purchase another homestead within a
reasonable time. '29
The issue of whether the proceeds from a voluntary sale of
homestead are exempt from the claims of creditors also was ad-
dressed in In re McCarthy. There, debtors argued they were enti-
tled to the exemption, and the trustee objected. At a hearing on
the objections, the debtor and his wife stated they were unable to
make the house payments and could rent an apartment at lower
cost.31 Further, the debtors testified they had no plans to purchase
a replacement homestead in Florida but, rather, intended to divide
the net proceeds between them. Citing to Orange Brevard, the
court held that the debtor did not come within the case law excep-
tion to the general rule that proceeds from the sale of a homestead
are personalty.32 The debtor's claim failed because intent to rein-
vest in a replacement homestead was lacking.
In Roemelmeyer v. Vidana (In re Vidana),3 - the proceeds ex-
emption issue arose in the context of an alleged attempt by the
debtor to defraud creditors.3 4 The debtor had conveyed his home-
stead to his daughter who, in turn, had sold the property to an
25. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original). In so holding, the court acknowledged that home-
stead law is to be liberally construed to allow the exemption to debtors. Id. at 430.
26. 427 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
27. Id. at 229.
28. Id. at 229 n.1 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 230 (citation omitted).
30. 13 Bankr. 389 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
31. Id. at 390.
32. Id. at 391 n.1. See Tingle v. Hornsby, 111 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959) (stat-
ing the general rule that once the contract for sale has been entered, the vendor's interest
becomes personalty). Personal property also enjoys an exemption under Florida law, but
only to the value of $1,000. FLA. CONST. art X, § 4(a)(2).
33. 19 Bankr. 787 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
34. Id. at 788.
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unrelated third party. In citing Orange Brevard, the court stated
that "[h]omestead proceeds lose their exempt character unless
they are promptly reinvested in another homestead. ' 35 The court
found that the debtor's daughter was "the debtor's alter ego or a
straw man in a plan to convert the homestead into cash and se-
crete the debtor's share of the proceeds .... "31
Orange Brevard also was applied in Havee v. Rodriguez (In re
Rodriguez),'7 in which the debtor claimed that proceeds from the
sale of his house were protected despite several transfers of prop-
erty prior to his purchasing a replacement homestead. 38 Sifting
through complicated facts, the court denied the exemption, stating:
[Tihe proceeds from the debtor's original homestead were so
commingled with his income and the proceeds of loans received
by [the corporation], and so many months passed between receipt
of the sale proceeds and reinvestment in a new home, that it is
impossible for this court to conclude that the possible infusion of
some proceeds from the first homestead protects the debtor's
ownership and homestead status of the second home. 9
Although the burden of proof on the debtor in claiming the ex-
35. Id.
36. Id.; see Milton v. Milton, 58 So. 718, 719 (Fla. 1912) ("Organic and statutory provi-
sions relating to homestead exemptions should be liberally construed in the interest of the
family home. But the law should not be so applied as to make it an instrument of fraud or
imposition upon creditors.").
37. 24 Bankr. 12 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). The trustee filed a complaint against the
debtor, the debtor's wife, and the debtor's closely held corporation, Arimar Construction,
Inc., claiming that the debtor had fraudulently conveyed personal funds to the corporation,
and that a later conveyance of a residence owned by the corporation to the debtor and his
wife was void.
38. Id. at 14. In April 1979, the debtor and his wife sold their home and moved into
rental property. The debtor generally used proceeds from the sale to pay living expenses
and debts, but a portion of the proceeds was contributed to the corporation. In 1980, the
corporation constructed the home in which the debtor and his family were living at the time
of the suit. Although the debtors moved into the house in June, the corporation made mort-
gage payments from June to December 1980. In December, the corporation transferred a
quitclaim deed to the debtor.
On March 2, 1981, the debtor filed for bankruptcy. In his capacity as the sole shareholder
of the corporation, the trustee raised a derivative claim, alleging that the conveyance to the
debtor and his wife was a void conveyance. Id. at 13. The court impressed a trust in favor of
the corporation on the real property conveyed by it to the debtor and his wife and granted
an equitable lien in favor of the trustee on the real property. The court returned the house
to the corporation encumbered by a lien which was a direct asset of the debtor's estate. Id.
at 14.
39. Id. at 14. The debtor argued that his new residence was a replacement homestead
and that the various intervening transfers could not be attacked because they were simply
part of the process of funneling proceeds out of one homestead into another.
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empt status allowed by Orange Brevard is that of a preponderance
of the evidence, the above cases illustrate that it is possible for a
debtor to prove implicitly the intent to reinvest in a replacement
homestead. However, evidence of flagrant wrongdoing may be
enough to eliminate any chance of winning an exemption.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS
Beyond an examination of Florida law as set forth in Orange
Brevard concerning the exempt status of proceeds from a volun-
tary sale, it is necessary to examine the manner in which courts
construe homestead exemptions. The Orange Brevard court, rely-
ing on Florida case law, determined that "homestead exemption
laws should be liberally applied to the end that the family shall
have shelter and shall not be reduced to absolute destitution ...
Obviously Article X intended to confer valuable rights on the'
owner of the homestead and was not drawn for the benefit of
creditors."4 °
Historically, homestead exemption laws have been construed so
as to implement their purpose."1 The exemption is designed "to
promote the stability and welfare of the state by encouraging prop-
erty ownership and independence on the part of the citizen, and by
preserving a home where the family may be sheltered and live be-
yond the reach of economic misfortune.' '42 The homestead exemp-
tion laws are intended to protect a broader range of debtors than
just those economically disadvantaged.
[They] are intended to secure to the householder a home for him-
self and family, regardless of his financial condition-whether he
is solvent or insolvent-without reference to the number of his
creditors, and without any special regard to the extent of the es-
tate or title by which the homestead property may be owned.43
40. Orange Brevard, 137 So. 2d at 204 (citations omitted) (citing Olesky v. Nicholas, 82
So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1955); Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1954); Bessemer Properties v.
Gamble, 27 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1946)); see also Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1962).
41. See Elliott v. Till, 259 N.W. 460, 464 (Iowa 1935) ("That the homestead statute must
be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose, there is no question. This has been too often
reiterated in courts to need any citation of authorities."); see also Kohn v. Coats, 138 So.
760 (Fla. 1931) (court held that proceeds from a fire insurance policy are exempt from the
claims of creditors); Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 84 So. 190 (Fla. 1920) (court held that actual
damages recovered in an action by a homestead owner for an unlawful invasion of the home-
stead rights assume the same exempt status as the homestead).
42. 29 FLA. JUR. 2D Homesteads § 3, at 271-72 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
43. Id. § 3, at 272.
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Recent cases in Florida and other jurisdictions have consistently
followed this orientation to the construction of homestead exemp-
tion laws, promulgating the policy that such laws are to be con-
strued in favor of the debtor" "as a matter of public policy to pre-
serve a home for the family and to protect the family even from
the just demands of creditors. 45
IV. ANALYSIS OF McGuire
The McGuire court recognized that homestead exemption laws
are to be liberally construed to achieve their underlying policy
aims.46 However, an analysis of the court's application of Orange
Brevard shows a strict construction of the proceeds exemption ar-
ticulated therein. The McGuire court found that the debtor had
failed to prove that arrangements had been made for the purchase
of a replacement homestead or that he had the requisite intent to
purchase a replacement homestead. 7 The court also held that the
debtor had failed to show that funds "in the passbook account
were generated solely from the sale of the property. ' 8 Had the
court applied the criteria set out in Orange Brevard in the spirit of
the intent and purpose of exemption laws, a decision more congru-
ent with public policy considerations would have resulted.
The former residence of the debtor qualified for homestead ex-
emption.49 In order for the proceeds of the voluntary sale to retain
exempt status, the debtor had to prove a presale intent and an at-
sale intent to reinvest the proceeds of the sale in a replacement
homestead. The death of the debtor and his consequent inability
to testify at trial affected his widow's ability to prove the requisite
intent to reinvest in a replacement homestead. However, the court
did not consider the peculiar circumstances before it.5 0
44. In re Arnold, 33 Bankr. 765 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Redmon, 31 Bankr. 756,
759 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) ("any ambiguities found in state exemption laws must be re-
solved in favor of debtors"); In re Jones, 31 Bankr. 20 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983); In re
Hersch, 23 Bankr. 42 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
45. LaGasse v. Aetna Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 454, 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968) (emphasis added),
rev'd on other grounds, 223 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1969).
46. McGuire, 37 Bankr. at 366.
47. "There is no evidence in the record that at the time of the sale, the Debtor had
taken any steps to arrange for the purchase of a replacement residence or that he had any
intent to do so." Id. at 366-67.
48. Id. at 367 (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 366.
50. Other courts have considered surrounding circumstances including the importance of
the testimony of the parties and health problems in the disposition of cases involving home-
stead exemption. See, e.g., Charter v. Thomas, 292 N.W. 842, 843 (Iowa 1940) (issue was
1985]
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Likewise, evidence of the debtor's $1,000 deposit on a residential
lot prior to his death and the fact that the debtor's widow and two
minor children were living with another son at the time of trial
allowed the court to find implicit intent to reinvest the proceeds
from the sale of the old homestead in a replacement homestead.,"
However, the court declined to find such intent. The totality of the
circumstances, viewed in light of the policy of liberal construction
given homestead exemptions, would seem to have established the
necessary intent required by Orange Brevard.
In addressing the requirement that monies from a voluntary sale
remain in a separate account, the McGuire court found that the
debtor had failed to prove the funds in the savings account were
"solely" from the sale of the home. As with the intent criteria dis-
cussed above, the circumstances surrounding the handling of the
monies from the sale allowed the court to find that the monies
were not commingled with other funds. The evidence presented at
trial showed that at the time of the debtor's death, the net pro-
ceeds minus the $1,000 deposit were held in a savings account.5
From the $1,000 deposit on a residential lot, the court might eas-
ily have inferred the intent to reinvest in a replacement home-
stead. However, the court refused to make that inference and fur-
thermore declined to characterize the deposit as an actual
reinvestment in a new dwelling.53 The court left unclear its charac-
terization of the nature of the deposit.
whether the debtor had abandoned as part of the homestead rented portions of his dwelling;
"[tihe question is one of intention and that must usually be determined from the testimony
of the parties in the light of the surrounding circumstances"); State v. Brown, 218 P. 816,
820 (Okla. 1923) ("We do not think, as a matter of law, that a man would be required to
transact such matters as to purchase a homestead, so long as he continued in ill health
.... [Mien in this condition frequently defer matters, and wait in the hope that they will
soon regain their health .... ").
51. The debtor's widow testified she intended to purchase a home if she prevailed in the
litigation. McGuire, 37 Bankr. at 366. It seems the court went out of its way to find the
requisite intent lacking, commenting, "[T]here is no evidence of the amount that the Debtor
intended to reinvest in a principal residence even if an intent to reinvest can be inferred
from the circumstances." Id.
52. Id. at 367. The court did not reach the issue of whether the proceeds from the volun-
tary sale were reinvested in a reasonable time. Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(a) (1984), which allows
a homestead owner two years to purchase and occupy a new residence in order to take
advantage of the partial nonrecognition provisions in the Internal Revenue Code, should be
looked to as a guide for both homeowners and courts in attempting to define "reasonable
time."
53. McGuire, 37 Bankr. at 367. Contra Elliot v. Till, 259 N.W. 460, 464 (Iowa 1935)
("From the moment this lot was bought it then became invested with the homestead charac-
ter, even prior to the building of the house thereon.").
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V. CONCLUSION
The exempt status of proceeds from the voluntary sale of a
homestead shares the chameleon-like character of Florida's other
homestead exemption laws. 4 The Orange Brevard court, in keep-
ing with the spirit of liberal construction of homestead laws, set
forth four criteria that the debtor must meet in order to claim this
exemption. The broad language of the Orange Brevard opinion al-
lows courts a great deal of flexibility. However, practitioners and
homeowners may have problems meeting the burden of proof req-
uisite to the case law exception if the Orange Brevard rule is ap-
plied strictly.
Presale intent and intent at the time of the sale of a homestead
to purchase a replacement homestead are particularly difficult to
prove. Neither the Orange Brevard court nor courts applying the
Orange Brevard criteria have proffered guidelines to determine
whether a home owner displayed an outward manifestation to buy
a new or replacement homestead before selling the old homestead.
Enlightened courts will look to actions of debtors after the sale of
the home to find whether such intent can be inferred. 5 The rea-
sonable time limitation to claiming the proceeds exemption is to be
determined in relation to the circumstances of the particular case.
As with the intent criteria, the particular court's approach to the
issue and sensitivity to facts can be crucial. The requirement that
monies from the sale of the old homestead cannot be commingled
with other funds acts to trap unwary homeowners who fail to take
particular care to keep proceeds from the sale of the homestead in
a special account. This harsh result is contrary to the spirit of ex-
emption laws.
A liberal construction of the criteria set forth in Orange Brevard
furthers the purpose of homestead exemptions and at the same
time protects creditors from fraud and deceit. A strict application
of Orange Brevard can work to eliminate the exemption and leave
homeowners who are unaware of the intricacies of the law with no
protection from creditors.
From a legal positivist's point of view, the McGuire court's strict
application of Orange Brevard may be not only correct but lauda-
54. Crosby & Miller, supra note 8.
55. In re McCarthy, 13 Bankr. 389; 391 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) ("[T]he Court cannot
blind itself to subsequent events, particularly when trying to determine a matter as ephem-
eral as intent.").
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ble.56 From a public policy point of view, the court erred by strictly
applying a set of rules to a question that calls for a more humane,
liberal approach. 57
JAMES R. KLINDT
56. "The positivist thereby attempts to weed out moral judgments and policy considera-
tions and their resulting uncertainty and ambiguity. Positivism can lead to a perception of
law as static, which can all be viewed at one time." Van Doren, Implications of Jurispru-
dence to Law Teaching and Student Learning, 12 STETSON L. REV. 613, 618 (1983).
57. "[T]o secure the benevolent purposes of the homestead laws they should be broadly
and liberally construed . . . . Regard should be had to the spirit of the law rather than its
strict letter." Millsap v. Faulkes, 20 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Iowa 1945) (emphasis added).
